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STATE TORT ACTIONS FOR LIBEL AFTER
GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC.: IS THE
BALANCE OF INTEREST LEANING IN FAVOR
OF THE NEWS MEDIA?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed the scope
of first amendment restrictions on state tort actions for libel in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,, and held that a newspaper publishing defama-
tory falsehoods concerning a private individual could not claim a
constitutional privilege against liability. Further, if state law permits
recovery under a standard requiring less than a showing of knowledge
of falsity or of reckless disregard for truth, first amendment consider-
ations require that damages be limited to compensation for actual
injury. This holding drastically affects the existing common law rem-
edies for an action of libel in the various states.' This note will first
outline the common law remedies for libel, using Ohio law as a
typical example, and placing special emphasis on culpability and
damage considerations. Thereafter, decisions by the Supreme Court
requiring first amendment consideration for actions in libel will be
reviewed. The purpose of this note is to follow the Supreme Court's
attempts to balance the state interest in protecting the reputation of
private persons against the interest of the news media in protection
from unconstitutional censorship. In conclusion this note will suggest
that the Court's attempt to reach an equilibrium has fallen short by
greatly reducing the possibility of a private person's exoneration of
his own name.
II. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In 1968 a Chicago policeman killed a youth and the victim's
parents retained attorney Elmer Gertz to initiate civil proceedings
against the police officer. In the March, 1969, issue of American
Opinion, a monthly magazine published by Robert Welch, Inc. and
espousing the views of the John Birch Society, there appeared an
article entitled: "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and the War on Po-
, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2 Common law tort actions for libel vary in some aspects from state to state. Although
the Gertz case arose in Illinois, the Ohio case law parallels Illinois decisions concerning libel
actions. See, note 24 and accompanying text, infra. For purposes of this paper decisions of Ohio
courts will be used to trace the development of the common law tort action of libel.
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lice." The article was an effort of the magazine to warn its readers
of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local police departments. The
magazine believed that a communist-inspired conspiracy wanted to
replace local police departments with a federal police force which
could be used to support a communist dictatorship. In an effort to
confirm this belief, the managing editor commissioned a regular con-
tributor to investigate the pending suit against the accused police
officer.
The article stated that Gertz, as the architect of the "frame-up,"
had a large police file. Other statements in the article labeled the
attorney a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter." The article
named Gertz as an "official of the Marxist League for Industrial
Democracy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society,
which has advocated the violent seizure of our government. ' 3
Gertz sought $10,001 actual damages and $500,000 punitive dam-
ages on each of two counts. The district court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, finding that, under Illinois law, to falsely label someone
a communist is libel per se.1 At trial, the managing editor of
American Opinion, Scott Stanley, Jr., stated that the article's writer,
Alan Stang, had contributed articles in the past and had always been
accurate.5 Stanley admitted that he had not checked the accuracy of
the article. The jury awarded damages of $50,000.6 The district court
set aside the verdict on the grounds that recent Supreme Court cases7
granted a limited privilege under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. Since the article in the American Opinion concerned a matter
of public interest, the district court determined that the recent Su-
preme Court rule requires a plaintiff involved with a matter of public
interest to prove actual malice.' Failing in this, the publisher of the
article is entitled to immunity for his exercise of the first amendment
right to inform the public.
306 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. II1. 1969).
Id. The court noted that the scope of perse actions in Illinois recently have been narrowly
construed. Coursey v. Greater Miles Township Publishing Corp., 82 Ill. App. 2d 76,227 N.E.2d
164 (1967); Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 I11. App. 2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966).
The alleged defamatory statement here was found by the court to injure the plaintiff in his trade,
which is a requirement for a per se action of defamation. A discussion of the common law
requirements for an action of libel follows in section three of this note.
' 322 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D. Il1. 1970).
6 Id. at 998.
7 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1 Actual malice was defined by the Supreme Court to be knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-88 (1964).
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Elmer Gertz appealed from the district court's opinion on two
grounds.9 He denied first that false statements are entitled to a first
amendment privilege; he argued secondly that if the privilege does
apply, then actual malice had been proved.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court determination
that the article concerned a matter of public interest. The court stated
that the truth of a statement is not the determining factor for the first
amendment privilege and to hold otherwise would undermine the
rule. What is required, rather, is to prove actual malice and thus it
must be shown that the publisher had a "high degree of awareness
of. . .probable falsity."' 10 The court of appeals concluded that the
record revealed a failure of the plaintiff to establish actual malice to
the required standard of "convincing clarity.""
The Supreme Court's grant of Gertz's writ of certiorari 2 stated
that the Court intended to review the existing balance between first
amendment protection for a free press and common law libel
actions.13 The Court had attempted to delineate this balance in an
earlier case, but had been unable to reach a controlling rationale for
the result. 4 The consequent confusion of the lower courts' attempt
to apply constitutional standards without the guidance of a majority
opinion of the Surpeme Court convinced the Justices that a reconsi-
deration of the existing accommodation was desirable.15
A majority of the Justices in Gertz were able to agree on a
standard of fault for determining liability in a defamation case involv-
ing a private person.'" The Court held that "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood. . . .'"' Further, the Court made clear that
although the state had a legitimate interest in compensating injured
reputations of private persons, and could establish a less restrictive
fault standard (Le. proof of negligence as the minimum standard of
471 F.2d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
92 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
t 418 U.S. at 325.
" Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
' In the three year interim Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Court, filling vacan-
cies left by Justices Harlan and Black.
,1 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
Rehnquist and Blackmun. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun state that if his vote
were not needed to create a majority holding, he would adhere to the plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
11 418 U.S. at 347.
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calpability rather than actual malice), this standard could apply only
to the recovery of actual damages. The Court emphasized that the
recovery of presumed or punitive damages required a showing of
constitutional actual malice, (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth). Applying these standards to the facts before
the Court, the majority affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of
Gertz's appeal.
In order to estimate the effect of this ruling on state tort actions
for libel, it will be necessary to briefly outline the remedies available
to a wrongfully defamed individual under common law. By compar-
ing the common law practices to the recently articulated first amend-
ment restrictions on those practices, an estimate of the future protec-
tion to individuals offered by state libel actions will emerge.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTION OF LIBEL IN OHIO
Let the lying lips be put to silence which cruelly, disdainfully
and despitefully speak against the righteous.'"
The civil action for libel dates back to man's earliest legal code.
An action for libel is cited in Exodus'9 and was part of Greek and
Roman law.2" As the law later developed in England, monetary relief
replaced the harsh physical punishments which were the standard
relief offered by the early courts.'
In one of the first actions for libel in Ohio, Judge Wright of the
Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Where one, falsely and maliciously, orally charges another with
anything involving moral turpitude, which, if true, will subject him
to infamous punishment, or that tends to exclude him from society,
or to prejudice him in his office, profession, trade, or business, the
parties accused may seek redress by a suit in slander, and recover
without proof of actual damages. Where the words are false, the law
infers malice, and where their natural tendency is to injure, the law
presumes damages . . . . [W]here the slander is written and pub-
lished, it is denominated libel. . . . Words of ridicule only, or of
contempt, which merely tend to lessen a man in public esteem, or
to wound his feelings, will support a suit for libel, because of their
being embodied in a more permanent and enduring form; of the
,Psalm 31.
" Exodus 23:1.
20 For a complete survey of the ancient origins of the law of defamation, see M. NEWELL,
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1890).
2, For an article outlining the development of the action for libel in England, see Lovell,
The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1962).
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increased deliberation and malignity of their publication, and of
their tendency to provoke breaches of the public peace. 2
In a case brought by a federal district court judge against the
editor of a newspaper for an article depiciting the judge as a "purse-
proud aristocrat" who was "anxious to put down the Bank of the
United States to promote his own pecuniary interests" the Ohio Su-
preme Court held:
A libel is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture, or sign, made
with a mischievous and malicious intent toward government, magis-
trates, or individuals. It does not necessarily charge the plaintiff
with a crime, for it its design be wanton and malicious ridicule, and
the tendency of the publication to hold up the plaintiff to the scoffs
and sneers of society; to degrade him and lessen his standing, an
action may well be sustained. So, likewise, if its tendency will natu-
rally excite to passion and revenge, and consequent breaches of the
peace.?
These early cases reflect the concern of the courts about the
injury inflicted upon individual reputations by false statements. Both
cases recognize the need for an action in libel to prevent injured
parties from seeking self-help remedies.
The common law action of libel requires the plaintiff to prove
four elements. The defendant must have (1) made a statement (2) that
is defamatory and (3) published the statement (i.e., made it known
to third parties). The statement must also be (4) read by third parties
as concerning the plaintiff (this element is also called colloquim). In
Ohio a distinction has developed between an action based on words
which are libelous per se and words which are libelous per quod.M For
2 Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 532, 533 (1834) (citations omitted).
" Tappan v. Wilson, 7 Ohio 191, 193-94 (1835).
24 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 593, 37 N.E.2d 584, 594 (1941). The distinction
between libel perse and libelper quod is not uniform in this country. Dean Prosser, in his article
Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960), states that there are three current distinctions. A
minority of the states (Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey and
Texas) follow the English Rule of recognizing all libels as libelperse and therefore not requiring
pleading or proof of special damages even where extrinsic proof is required to establish the
defamatory meaning of the statement. A majority of the states, including Ohio, require the
pleading of special damages in libel per quod actions unless the defamatory statement falls into
one of four categories. If the defamatory statement (1) imputes a criminal act, (2) imputes
unchastity, (3) impugns the plaintiff's trade or business, or (4) exposes the plaintiff to ridicule
or contempt in his community (e.g., loathsome disease), then the defamation is treated as libel
per se. The newest trend of the law is to require pleading special damages in all libel cases unless
the defamation falls within one of the above four categories. Dean Prosser states that Virginia
has adopted this theory and is joined by Washington. Recently Illinois has announced its
intention to follow the Virginia model. Mitchell v. Peroria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d
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words to be libelous per se they must, on their face, accuse the plain-
tiff of an illegal or immoral act. 5 If the words that are the source of
the action are susceptible of an innocent reading, then Ohio courts
apply the rule of mitior sensus and assume the inoffensive interpreta-
tion. 6 If extrinsic facts must be known to the reader to make the
statement defamatory, then the action is one of libel per quod and
the plaintiff must meet special pleading requirements to maintain his
action. The plaintiff has the burden of pleading (1) the extrinsic facts
that render the apparent innocent statement a defamatory one, (2)
that the readers knew the necessary extrinsic facts, and (3) that the
plaintiff suffered injury thereby.2 1
The distinction between action for libel per se and per quod can
be crucial in the determination of the burdens of allegation, of proof
of defamation, and of proof of damages. If the words are determined
to be libelous per se, the plaintiff need neither plead nor prove special
damages (i.e., damages which result from the defamation though they
are not a natural or probable result and thus cannot be assumed),
since general damages (i.e., those that are the natural and necessary
result of the defamatory statement) will be presumed as a matter of
law. In an action based on words that are determined to be libelous
per quod, on the other hand, the plaintiff must prove that the article
had a defamatory meaning, and to recover damages the plaintiff must
plead and prove special damages.28
Malice is a necessary element of the action of libel.29 The term
"malice" as used in Ohio connotes a concept of willfulness and un-
154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966). This article has been criticized. See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule
of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1966) and Dean Prosser's reply, Prosser, More Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629 (1966).
7 Sweeny v. The Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 473, 35 N.E.2d 471 (1941).
28 Johnson v. Campbell, 91 Ohio App. 483, 108 N.E.2d 749 (1952). This limiting interpre-
tation is followed by Illinois, John v. Tribune Co., 24 I11. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962) cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962); Montana, Manley v. Harer, 73 Mont. 253, 235 P. 757 (1925);
North Dakota, Ellsworth v. Martindale Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400
(1936); Oklahoma, Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 174 Okla. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935).
2 McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 101 Ohio App. 297, 136 N.E.2d 393 (1956). The
best example of libel per quod is the case of a newspaper which published an erroneous report
that plaintiff had given birth to twins. Although the words, on their face, do not allege any
impropriety on the part of the plaintiff, the extrinsic fact that some readers knew that plaintiff
had been married only a month caused the publication to be libelous per quod. Morrison v.
Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (Ct. Sess., 1902).
11 See Isham, Libel Per Se and Libel Per Quod in Ohio, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (1954). This
article discusses the problem of determining the proper test for distinguishing the two categories
of libel, and the issue as to whether it is the court or the jury that should make the determina-
tion.
2, Harris v. Reams, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 281 (C.P., Logan, 1860).
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lawfulness" rather than of personal animosity.31 An express or im-
plied intent of the defendant to hurt the plaintiff is necessary,' 2 but
as the common law considered neither mistake nor good faith to be
a defense, an intent to injure is usually assumed by the courts. 3
The purpose of the court in awarding damages is to make the
injured party whole from the harassment he has suffered. 34 The jury
is to arrive at the amount by considering the character and standing
of the plaintiff, the gravity of the libel, and any mitigating circum-
stances (such as a retraction) by the defendant. 35 In either libel per
se or libel per quod, punitive damages are available only if the plain-
tiff can prove that the defendant acted with express malice (i.e., intent
to injure36) or with recklessness. 37
It may be seen through case law that the courts of Ohio have
sought to protect the individual's right to an untarnished reputation.
The purpose of the common law in creating this legal right was to
prevent the "breaches of the public peace" which personal libels
tended to provoke. 31 It is important to note that the culpability of
the defendant was not considered in determining liability. Rather, it
was only a factor in the consideration of punitive damages. In order
to protect this right of reputation, the legal system allowed general
damages to compensate the plaintiff.
In many cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and
indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof in
loss to the person defamed.39
In an Ohio libel action one court summarized the liability of a defen-
dant by stating that, "whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his
peril.""
In Ohio, libeling an individual as a communist is libel per se. In
a State v. Cass, 5 Ohio N.P. 381 (C.P., Lucas, 1898).
at Id.
n Van Derveer v. Sutphin, 5 Ohio St. 294 (1855).
Wilson v. Apple, 3 Ohio 270 (1827).
a' Pugh v. Starbuck, I Ohio Dec. Reprint 143 (Super. Ct. Cinti., 1845).
a Rollins v. Pennock, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 735 (C.P. Logan, 1862).
a Van Derveer v. Sutphin, 5 Ohio St. 294 (1855).
Haywood v. Foster, 16 Ohio 88 (1847). The court stated that it was necessary to allow
a larger award of damages against a defendant who acted with knowledge of the falsity of his
statements than against the defendant who acted only negligently. To aid in this differentiation,
the court held that punitive damages can be assessed against a knowing defendant but not
against a merely negligent defendant.
11 Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 532 (1834).
z' RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 621, comment a (1938).
4o Petransky v. Repository Printing Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 309,200 N.E. 647, 648 (1935).
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Ward v. League for Justice,41 a right-wing publisher labeled a union
officer as "being one of the most active and treacherous Communists
in Ohio."4" The court concluded that
the published words, if believed, would naturally tend to expose the
plaintiff . . . to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, and deprive
him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, and
such publication is therefore libelous per se and an action will lie
therefore, although no special damage is alleged."
The court considered the effect of falsely labeling an individual a
communist with the prevailing social attitude towards communism
and cited a New York case which held that falsely charging a lawyer
with being a communist was libel per se in light of recent war events,
legislation, and public attitudes towards communism." The Ohio su-
preme court dismissed the defendant's appeal, stating that no debata-
ble constitutional question was involved.45
Such was the state of the law of libel in Ohio when the Supreme
Court of the United States decided New York Times v. Sullivan in
1967.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT CREATES A FEDERAL LAW OF LIBEL
A. The New York Times Case
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court added
constitutional considerations to the common law action of libel. The
case concerned an advertisement published by The New York Times
on March 29, 1960, soliciting contributions to the legal defense of a
civil rights figure. The Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama brought suit for defamation, alleging factual misrepresentation
concerning the actions of the Montgomery police department.47 The
Alabama court used the common law libel doctrine that all libels are
libel per se, and the jury awarded damages of $500,000.1
,1 57 Ohio L.Abs. 197 (Ct. App. 1950).
42 Id. at 202.
4 Id.
"1 Levy v. Gelber, 175 N.Y. Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Super. Ct. Bronx, 1941).
"1 154 Ohio St. 367, 95 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
46 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41 Specifically, the advertisement stated that truckloads of police ringed the campus and
that when students attempted to protest by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was pad-
locked in order to starve the students into submission. The advertisement further alleged that
the police had arrested Dr. Martin Luther King seven times. The prosecution proved that the
police never encircled the campus and that Dr. King was arrested only four times.
4s 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the state supreme
court's decision, holding that the Alabama rule of law inadequately
protected the first and fourteenth amendment rights of the press in a
libel action concerning a public official.49 The Court reasoned that a
biased local jury could "shackle the First Amendment in its attempt
to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources.' "I' If newspapers faced large damage
assessments by local juries with a strict liability standard (i.e., pre-
sumption of malice and general damages), newspaper editors would
be forced to screen out any news item which may even remotely be
found libelous. This strict liability standard would particularly limit
debate on public issues [which] should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officiils. 1
In order to protect a free press in its commentary on the actions
of a public official, the Court adopted the Kansas state law doctrine
of qualified privilege."2 This privilege added the element of culpability
to a tort action and required a plaintiff to prove that the statement
was made with "actual malice." The Court defined actual malice as
publishing with knowledge that the statement is false or publishing
with reckless disregard of whether the statement is true or false.53
The Court deemed it proper that critics of official conduct were
granted a degree of the same immunity from actions in libel that
public officials are granted.54
Justices Black and Douglas concurred with the majority's con-
clusion, but believed that the Times had an absolute and uncondi-
tional privilege under the first amendment.55 Mr. Justice Goldberg
also concurred with the majority and believed that the first amend-
ment provided an absolute privilege. However, he would limit this
absolute privilege to libel actions brought by public officials because
"' The first amendment had previously been found to apply to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
376 U.S. at 266.
" Id. at 270.
52 The Supreme Court quotes at length from Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P.
281 (1908). The Kansas supreme court adopted an "actual malice" standard for culpability and
extended the qualified privilege to comments concerning public issues, public men and candi-
dates for public office.
376 U.S. at 279-80.
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) determined that government officials are immune
from prosecution for libelous statements made in the course of their public duties.
376 U.S. at 293 (1964).
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"[t]he imposition of liability for. . . defamation [of private citizens]
does not abridge the freedom of public speech ... "I'
Until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the law of libel was
considered to be unfettered by the Constitution. The peculiar wording
of the first amendment seemed to limit that amendment's protection
to laws legislated by the federal congress and to legislative work only
so far as new laws abridge the freedom of the press.57 Thus, the
amendment was thought to permit existing restrictions on the press,
including the state libel action.' Even past decisions of the Supreme
Court sustained this restrictive reading of the first amendment,59 and
referred to "Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech . . .-.
The Supreme Court did not have to reach the constitutional
considerations to protect the New York Times from the "biased
juries across the county."'" Since courts have generally supervised
libel awards to prevent jury awards not "based upon a rational con-
sideration of the evidence and a proper application of the law,""2 the
Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and could have reversed the
decision by finding that the advertisement in question did not, as a
matter of law, concern the plaintiff.6
56 Id. at 301-02.
" The first amendment states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (1791). See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and
the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581, 586 (1964).
-" Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263-66
(1961).
"' See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Merin, Libel and the Supreme
Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 373 (1969).
11 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, at 266 (1952). In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 715 (1931), the Court said:
But it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press
is essential to the protection of the public, and that the common law rules that subject
the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury,
are not abolished by the protection extended in our Constitution.
The Court took for granted the immunity of libel actions from first amendment restrictions in
the obscenity case of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957):
In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not
prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech.
61 E. THOMAs, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 63 (1973).
62 Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964). Colloquium is one of the four
necessary elements of a libel action.
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B. Expansion of Times Immunity to Public Figures
In the Times case, the Supreme Court held that a public official
cannot recover damages for false statements made concerning his
official conduct unless he can prove that the publisher acted with
"actual malice," i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth. This first instance of consideration by the Supreme Court
of the application of the first amendment to the law of libel could be
considered an extension of the common law "fair comment" rule.64
Under common law the issue would revolve around the question of
whether the damaging words were an honest criticism (i.e., fair com-
ment) or a negligent misstatement of fact. Under Times, both state-
ments are protected.
The Court's distinction between private persons and public offi-
cials was based upon two premises. First, the Court felt that a public
official had voluntarily put himself in the public eye and could there-
fore be considered as voluntarily exposing himself to the attacks of
critics. Secondly, the Court believed that a public official, unlike a
private person, had access to the news media to answer his defama-
tory criticism. Therefore, if a plaintiff is deemed a public official he
must carry a significantly heavier burden to obtain the advantage
available to private citizens of bringing a successful tort action in
libel: (1) recovery for damage sustained, (2) vindication of his honor,
and (3) deterrence of defamatory statements by the award of punitive
damages.
Immediately after the Court tendered its decision in Times two
problem issues developed. What actions by individuals would classify
them as public officials? Further, what actions by the publisher of the
defamatory statement would defeat this new first amendment privi-
lege against tort liability?
In Garrison v. Louisiana,5 the Supreme Court answered the
second question by limiting a plaintiff's grounds for defeating the
publisher's immunity created by the Times decision. The Court held
that subjective constitutional actual malice (i.e., knowing that the
statements were false or having reckless disregard as to whether or
not the statements were false) would defeat the constitutional immun-
ity. This subjective standard severely restricts the possibility of recov-
ery by a plaintiff for damages from a defendant who can successfully
invoke the constitutional privilege.
11 At common law newspapers could comment freely on the act of government and govern-
ment officials. This "fair comment" privilege could be defeated if the statement was malicious
and tended to excite revenge. Tappan v. Wilson, 7 Ohio 191 (1835).
65 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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With an almost unqualified privilege protecting media defen-
dants, the definition of public official became critical if any plaintiffs
were to have grounds to recover against the media. In a series of cases
prior to Gertz, the Supreme Court chose to broaden the classification
of persons subject to the Times first amendment immunity. In the
companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker,66 the court considered the issue of extending the
Times immunity to articles concerned with "public figures." At the
time of the alleged libel, the plaintiff Wally Butts was the athletic
director of the University of Georgia, but was employed by the Geor-
gia Athletic Association, a private organization.67 The Walker case
concerned a retired army general's actions during the University of
Mississippi's turmoil over the enrollment of James Meredith. Gen-
eral Walker was a strong critic of federal intervention and the Court
considered him to be a "man of some political prominence."68
In these two cases the Court was unable to formulate a majority
opinion. Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joined in the
plurality opinion which found that the Times requirement of actual
malice need not be shown in order for the newspaper to lose its
qualified immunity. These Justices found that the newspaper in the
Butts case was at least grossly negligent and possibly reckless in not
checking the story submitted by an unproven source. 9 The plurality
opinion, on the other hand, held that the privilege is qualified but
should apply with a lesser standard of culpability in a case where the
plaintiff is a "public figure." The plurality opinion would apply a
standard of "highly unreasonable conduct" as evidenced by "extreme
departure from standards of investigation . . . adhered to by respon-
sible publishers."70 Justices Brennan and White joined with Chief
Justice Warren who believed that the Times doctrine should be ex-
panded to include plaintiffs who are "public figures." The policy that
governed the Times decision, the Justices argued, should also control
66 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
67 Although the University of Georgia is a state institution, the athletic director is hired
by the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation. This determination was reached in
a previous Supreme Court case, Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439
(1938). Under state statute athletic associations are not to be considered an agency of the state.
GA. CODE ANN. § 32-153 (1969).
s 388 U.S. at 140.
66 Id., at 158. The plaintiff charged that the author's source was on criminal probation.
The plaintiff submitted evidence showing that the magazine had a "muckraking" format and
that the editors knew of the source's probation, but that the editors published the article without
independent confirmation of the accusations. 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
70 388 U.S. at 158.
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here. Individuals who publicly advocate a position on issues of con-
cern to the public accept the same threat of criticism as do public
officials. Because these public figures are not subject to the "restraint
of the political process,' 7 1 and yet are as influential as public.officers,
public opinion may be the only method by which public figures may
be censured. Justices Black and Douglas would have dismissed both
cases because of the absolute immunity that the first amendment
requires for the news media.
The Butts case was remanded for a determination by the lower
court of the level of culpability of the defendant. The Walker case
was deemed to contain no evidence permitting the conclusion of the
presence of actual malice or gross negligence, so it was remanded to
the lower court with instructions to dismiss the action.
These companion cases served to extend the application of the
Times doctrine to "public figures." Four Justices would have lowered
the standard to gross negligence, but seven Justices (i.e., those four
plus three others) agreed that the defendants would have been held
liable if the plaintiffs were able to show actual malice. The plurality
contained dicta stating that "public interest" caused these gentlemen
to come under the label of "public figures." Chief Justice Warren,
in his concurring opinion, echoes the plurality opinion by stating:
The present cases involve not "public officials," but "public fig-
ures" whose views and actions with respect to public issues and
events are often of as much concern to the citizen as the attitude
and behavior of "public officials" with respect to the same issues
and events.72
The thrust of the Court's judgment pointed to the position of the
plaintiff in the social eye. The dicta, however, suggests that the public
interest in the issue in which the individuals are enmeshed may be
determinative as to whether the privilege may be claimed.
C. The Expansion of Times Immunity to Issues of Public Interest
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court up-
held a radio station's claim to Times immunity in an action for libel
brought by a private person, thereby extending the protections of
media defendants beyond suits brought by public officials. Rosen-
bloom was a distributor of nudist magainzines and was arrested for
violation of the city's obscenity laws. A radio station owned by Me-
" Id. at 164.
72 Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
73 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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tromedia, Inc. reported as part of its news coverage that Rosenbloom
was the main distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia. Rosen-
bloom was acquitted of the obscenity charge and sued Metromedia,
Inc. for libel. The Supreme Court held that Rosenbloom's action for
libel was barred by the Times privilege. The Court was unable, how-
ever, to reach a majority rationale for its holding. Justice Brennan,
who wrote the plurality opinion, 74 stated:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is in-
volved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntar-
ily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the partici-
pant's prior anonymity or notoriety.75
Justice Brennan found that the prior distinction between private and
public individuals based on their access to the media for reply was
unproven and probably incorrect. He argued that this distinction
would be better resolved by state right-of-reply or retraction statutes
rather than by limiting the Times privilege.76 The plurality opinion
would permit a successful action for libel against a media defendant
concerning an event of public or general interest only upon clear and
convincing proof that the publication was printed with knowledge of
falsity or with reckless disregard for the article's veracity. Thus, the
opinion required the plaintiff to meet a more stringent burden of
proof for actual malice than the traditional common law standard of
proof, requiring only a preponderance of the evidence. 7
Justice Black concurred, but felt that the first amendment re-
quired an absolute immunity for the news media.78 Justice White also
concurred, but on narrower grounds than the plurality rationale. He
believed that the Times immunity gave the news media
a privilege to report and comment upon the official actions of public
servants in full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or
the privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the official
7' Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
" 403 U.S. at 43 (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 46-47. The constitutionality of these statutes has recently been reviewed and
restricted by the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974). See Note, Access vs. Fairness in Newspapers: The Implications of Tornillo.for a Free
and Responsible Press, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 954 (1974).
11 Campbell v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., No. 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist., March,
1972) (unreported).
78 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971).
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action be spared from public view.79
Since Metromedia merely reported the police action taken against
Rosenbloom, Metromedia was entitled to the Times immunity. Jus-
tice White believed that the Court, had "displac[ed] more state libel
law than [was] necessary"8 by considering the public interest in the
topic of the article rather than the status of the plaintiff.
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that Rosenblocm was a private
individual and, therefore, the relevant state libel laws were applicable.
Justice Harlan, however, would prohibit any state statute from im-
posing liability unless it also required a minimal standard of fault.8
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented because of the
inadequate protection afforded personal reputations by the expansion
of the Times doctrine. Justice Marshall believed that a better balance
of first amendment protection for the news media and relief for the
injured private person would be to allow damages, but to restrict
damage awards to actual injury. State libel laws would be applicable
for determining liability but, in agreement with Justice Harlan's dis-
sent, there could be no finding of liability without some standard of
fault.82
The issue of limiting damage recoveries tc actual injury was
considered from three different perspectives. Justice Harlan would
allow punitive damages only after actual damages were proved, and
furthermore, the punitive damages would have to have a "reasonable
relationship" to the actual damages. Justice Marshall believed that
recoveries must be limited to actual damages only to avoid self-
censorship by newspapers fearful of substantial general damage
awards by the jury. He felt that Justice Harlan's "reasonable rela-
tionship" standard would be futile in avoiding self-censorship since
the jury would not have an objective standard to apply. The plurality
opinion dismissed the actual damage restrictions as an unrealistic
solution to the self-censorship problem. The mere possibility of costly
litigation and substantial actual damage awards would still serve to
inhibit newspaper publishers. The plurality opinion emphasized that
a more practical solution would be to require a culpability standard
(i.e., actual malice) coupled with a higher standard of proof (e.g.,
clear and convincing evidence).
Although Rosenbloom was decided without a majority opinion,
7 Id. at 62.
I' d. at 59.
I1 d. at 64.
2 d. at 86-87.
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it accurately defined the Times doctrine as it was applied by lower
courts prior to the Gertz decision.3 Times was concerned with pro-
tecting public debate on public issues by immunizing the news media
from actions in libel by "public officials." Butts broadened this con-
stitutional protection to actions brought by "public figures."
Rosenbloom serves to extend the Times immunity to any acticn for
libel where the defamatory statement concerns a public issue without
considering the status of the plaintiff.
D. The Effect of Rosenbloom on Ohio Libel Actions
Soon after the Rosenbloom decision was announced by the Su-
preme Court, a case involving a local newspaper as defendant in a
libel action came before the Ohio courts." Plaintiff Carl A. Campbell
sought damages in the amount of $350,000 for a false newspaper
article that stated that Carl Campbell, 35, had been fined $157 and
sentenced to six months in jail for driving while intoxicated. The
article further stated that Campbell had been convicted of driving
while intoxicated on four prior occasions and that Campbell was
currently a teacher in the Canton school system. The following day
the newspaper printed a retraction on the first page of the newspaper
explaining that the convicted individual was Carl Campbell, a truck
driver, not Carl A. Campbell, the school teacher. The trial court
granted the defendant a summary judgment on the basis of the Times
immunity. On appeal, the Ohio appellate court treated the plurality
opinion of Rosenbloom as if it had commanded a majority of the
Surpeme Court. 5 The majority opinion quoted at length from
Rosenbloom and held that the Supreme Court required that states
adopt an actual malice test for libel actions involving the news media
coverage of an event of public interest.
In considering whether actual malice was absent from this case,
the court quoted extensively from depositions taken of the reporter
of the article and the city editor of the paper. The facts disclosed that
the reporter turned in the first account of the conviction of Carl
13 Lower courts are not required to follow Supreme Court decisions which are not sup-
ported by a majority opinion. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 208 (1942). For a brief listing
of lower court decisions which barred a private individual from bringing an action for libel
against a member of the news media because of the public interest in the defamatory article,
see Case Note, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 151, 154 n. 20 (1971).
" Campbell v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., No. 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist., March
1972) (unreported).
11 Judge Putnam, in the majority opinion, wrote: "Mr. Justice Brennan speaking.or the
majority, in commenting upon the theory of negligence as a part of the law of libel, said. ..
Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
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Campbell within half an hour of the news deadline. The city editor
read the account and asked the reporter if this Carl Campbell was
the same Campbell who taught in the Canton school system. The
editor "thought" the reply was yes so he instructed the reporter to
add that information to the article. The editor admitted that he knew
Carl A. Campbell from board of education meetings and that he had
not made any effort to make a more positive identification. The city
editor also admitted that he did not know if the reporter knew Carl
A. Campbell and that the only reason the editor had asked the re-
porter if the two names were the same was the fact that the school
was in the reporter's beat. The editor further stated that he had no
doubt of the truth of the article or he would have done some addi-
tional investigation. The reporter stated that he had no knowledge of
the occupation of Carl Campbell. He said that he was not asked by
the editor if Campbell was a teacher but was in fact told that the two
Campbells were the same and that this information should be in-
cluded in the story. The reporter also stated that he never doubted
the truth of the article.
The majority opinion interpreted Rosenbloom as extending the
Times privilege to "include comment on private persons in matters
of public interest but did not change the standard of care known as
'actual malice, that is, knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard
of whether a fact is false or not.' "8 The court found that the defen-
dants had not "entertained a doubt as to the truth of the identifica-
tion, much less, a 'reckless disregard as to whether it was true or
false.' ",7 The court held that Rosenbloom requires the plaintiff to
establish his case by "clear and convincing" proof rather than the
previous state standard of a mere preponderance.
In conclusion, the court ruled that to maintain an action for libel
in Ohio against a member of the news media for an article concerning
an event of public interest, the plaintiff must prove by a clear and
convincing standard that the defendant (1) had knowledge that the
stated facts were false, or (2) that the article was published with
reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not. For reckless
disregard "the defendant in fact [must] entertain serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." 8
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rutherford also interpreted
Rosenbloom as extending the Times immunity to cases involving
Id. at 23.
s, Id. at 24.
" St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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public issues. However, Judge Rutherford found that there was a
genuine dispute as to the issue of whether the false statement was
published with reckless disregard of the truth. He concurred with the
majority, however, because of the plaintiff's failure to prove actual
damages-a necessary element for recovery under Rosenbloom for
private individuals involved in a public event. Judge Rutherford noted
that the damage to Campbell's reputation was not permanent, that
he was under no threat of losing his job, and that, outside of any
"6momentary personal concern" pending retraction, he had suffered
no actual damage.
This case changed the common law action of libel in Ohio as it
pertained to private individuals suing members of the news media.
Yet, the court based this change on a Supreme Court opinion which
did not receive the support of a majority of the Court. In the most
recent Ohio libel case, a private individual suing a newspaper for libel
saw his case dismissed for failure to meet the stringent criteria estab-
lished by the Campbell case."9 After Rosenbloom an Ohio plaintiff
could no longer hold a newspaper liable per se fbr defamation, nor
could he seek general damages for injury to personal reputation.
V. Gertz: THE SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO RE-EVALUATE THE
BALANCE OF INTERESTS
Originally an action for libel served four purposes. It permitted
the plaintiff to vindicate his honor, it insured the recovery of any
damages, it deterred undersirable speech by imposing punitive dam-
ages in appropriate cases, and it provided a lawful alternative to
individual acts of revenge. After Rosenbloom it became almost im-
possible to hold a newspaper liable for defamation. 0 Although
Rosenbloom was decided by only a plurality of the Court, its accept-
ance by lower courts as a constitutionally-required limitation on libel
actions was widespread, and consequently received much criticism 9
In response, the Supreme Court chose to reconsider the existing im-
balance between first amendment protections and the need to provide
a forum for an injured plaintiff.
89 Mead v. Horvitz Publishing Co., No. 2083 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist., 1973) (unreported);
appeal denied Vol. XLVI Ohio Bar 1484 (Oct. 18, 1973); cert denied, 416 U.S. 985, rehearing
denied 419 U.S. 887 (1974).
10 See Note, Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 56 IowA L. REV. 393 (1970).
11 See E. THOMAS, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER, 63 (1973); Note, Misinterpreting
the Supreme Court: An Analysis of How the Constitutional Privilege to Defame Has Been
Incorrectly Expanded, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 213 (1974).
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The majority of the Court in Gertz92 acknowledged that some
erroneous statements of fact should not be theoretically subject to
constitutional protection since they do not per se aid uninhibited
discussion of public issues. However, requiring the media to '.,guaran-
tee the accuracy of [all] factual assertions" was in violation of the
spirit of the first amendment since the threat of liability would require
the newspapers to exercise a too-stringent level of self-censorship. A
"breathing space" which would protect some false speech in the inter-
est of protecting all true speech was the solution. 3 Defining the
boundaries of this "space" was the problem before the Court in
Gertz, given the perspective afforded by litigation under Times and
Rosenbloom. The Court recognized that under Times some worthy
public officials were denied an equitable recovery. Nevertheless, the
limited state interest in protecting public persons was outweighed by
the need of immunity by the news media. However, the state had a
much greater interest in compensating private persons, and the ma-
jority set forth a different standard for actions brought by private
persons.
The Court's attempt to accommodate this state interest involved
two prongs - one directed to the status of the plaintiff, the other to
the damages permissable under state statute. The Court returned to
the Times case to reinstate the private versus public figure distinction
in order to define the status of the plaintiff. In creating guidelines for
lower courts to follow, the Court reasoned that a differentiation
based upon the status of the plaintiff would be easier to apply objec-
tively than a subjective standard of public interest. As in Times, this
test was rationalized as being based on the availability of avenues of
rebuttal for public persons as a means of a self-help remedy. A second
justification for this private versus public standard is the assumed
voluntary acceptance of the risk of published comments by public
persons. The Court stated that those persons who become public
figures involuntarily "must be exceedingly rare."94 The Court con-
cluded its consideration of the conflicting interests by stating that,
"private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than pub-
lic officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recov-
ery."'  By eliminating the "public interest" distinction, judges would
92 Justice Powell was joined by Justices Marshall, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
Marshall, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
9' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court further stated that
even in situations where involuntary public figures are involved, the media may reasonably
assume that the person voluntarily accepted his public status.
11 Id. at 345.
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no longer find themselves in the difficult position of deciding what
information should be of concern to the public. The breathing space
was thereby contracted so as to include only public officials or fig-
ures.
The majority believed that a proper accommodation also re-
quired a restriction on the state's ability to exact damages. Therefore,
the second prong of the holding prevented the states from imposing
strict liability by requiring a fault standard in all libel cases involving
a member of the news media. Requiring the plaintiff to prove the
defendant-news-broadcaster's fault is in accord with two of the major
goals of the common law libel action: i.e., punishing a culpable defen-
dant and allowing a plaintiff to vindicate his reputation. At the same
time members of the news media are protected from the "rigors of
strict liability for defamation,""8 thus satisfying the guarantees of the
first amendment. If the majority of the court had stopped here, then
all of the goals of a libel action would have been fulfilled (a culpable
party would be liable to a defamed person). However, even after
recognizing the compelling state interest in protecting private individ-
uals from damage to their reputations, the Court placed additional
restrictions on the recovery of monetary damages.
In limiting liability restrictions to a fault standard, the majority
stated that they were recognizing the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for actual damages. General or
punitive damages are prohibited by first amendment considerations
in the absence of proof of actual malice, which is defined as knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth. The majority believed
that this limitation on recovery was necessary to protect the media
from the "largely uncontrolled discretion of juries" which may lead
those juries "to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate
individuals for injury."97 By limiting recoveries to actual damages,
however, the Court ignored the fact that "in many cases the effect of
defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible
directly to trace the efforts thereof in loss to the persons defamed.""8
The Court foresaw that actual damages would not be limited to
monetary loss but would have included mental anguish, humuliation
and loss of community standing as actual injury. The Court con-
cluded its opinion by stating that in the case at bar, Gertz could not
be held to be a public figure since he did not engage in any attempt
to influence public attitudes, and his participation in this public affair
98 Id. at 348.
I d. at 349.
" See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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was limited to actions required by him as attorney for his client. The
Court remanded for jury determination of fault and actual damages
in line with the Court's new constitutional limitations on state libel
actions.
Justice Blackman stated in his concurring opinion that he joined
in the majority opinion because be believed that it offered an ade-
quate "breathing space" for the press, but that he would nevertheless
have preferred a wider immunity afforded the news media-i.e., the
Rosenbloom test of issues of public interest.
Chief Justice Burger dissented because he believed that the law
of libel respecting private individuals should be left to the states. He
would not impose constitutional requirements for the determination
of liability or damage recoveries on current state law. Further, Chief
Justice Burger believed that if the Court failed to promote a public
policy of protecting lawyers from defamation in their representative
role, the sixth amendment right to counsel might be jeopardized.
Justice Douglas dissented because he believed that the first
amendment requires an absolute privilege for the news media which
cannot be the subject of an "accommodation" with a state interest
in protecting individuals from false statements concerning their repu-
tation. Justice Douglas joined the majority in its belief that a jury's
imposition of damages may inhibit the press, but his belief lead to a
different result - only a complete immunity, rather than a limitation
based on actual damages, could offer the protection to the press
required by the first amendment.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the Court
should have adopted the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom. He de-
fended the Rosenbloom decision by citing the rationale of the plural-
ity opinion, (i.e., that public issues do not become less so because a
private persons is involved). Justice Brennan believed that the criti-
cism concerning the judicial determination of the public interest of
an issue was unfounded since the judiciary has broadly interpreted the
scope of public interest. He concluded by stating that any self-
censorship by publishers caused by the uncertainty of the public-
private determination of an issue would be considerably less than the
self-censorship arising from fear of liability from state actions based
upon a negligence standard.
Justice White, in his extensive dissent, argued that the majority
had failed to demonstrate the first amendment requirements which
would entail a complete rewriting of state defamation laws. He criti-
cized the majoriiy opinion for its apparent inconsistency in first con-
cluding that the state interest in protecting the reputations of private
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individuals surmounts first amendment considerations and then im-
posing first amendment limitations on damages in private actions for
libel. Justice White criticized the term "liability without fault" as
being misleading at best since any falsehood, on its face, implies some
degree of fault by even a good faith publisher. He also believed that
the majority's fear that libel actions could create an inhibited press
was not supported by the growth of newspapers in the face of existing
state libel laws. Justice White reiterated the need for general damages
in libel actions involving private persons and believed that adequate
protections from harsh jury verdicts existed in the mechanisms of
remittitur, granting of a new trial by the presiding judge, or appeal. 9
Justice White concluded by stating that he was in agreement with the
holding in the Times case, but that he believed that the qualified
immunity required by the first amendment should have been re-
stricted to cases involving public officials or figures and that the
states should be free to fashion laws protecting private individuals
from defamatory attacks on their reputation.
VI. THE "IMBALANCE" OF Gertz
The Court's purpose in granting certiorari in the Gertz case was
to reexamine the conflicting interest involved in a libel suit brought
by a private person against the news media. The Court recognized
that the wide acceptance of Rosenbloom as an announcement of
constitutional requirements had served to severely restrict, if not to
prevent altogether, a plaintiff's attempt to be recompensed for a
newspaper's defamation of his reputation if the defamation con-
cerned a matter of public interest. The Court in Gertz attempted an
"accommodation" between the first amendment concern for a free
press and the state interest in providing compensation for injured
individuals.
The Court's solution has two parts. First, the plaintiff, in order
to recover damages in an action for libel against a newspaper, must
meet a fault standard of at least negligence. This culpability reluire-
ment should adequately serve to protect innocent publishers of news
from unwarranted libel actions. Although this eliminates the libel per
se actions in Ohio, newspapers which defame private individuals
through negligent investiagation can be successfully sued for libel. If
this were the only restriction on the common law action for libel, then
the Court might have successfully reached an equitable balance, since
injured plaintiffs could recover money damages from blameworthy
11 418 U.S. at 394 n.31.
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newspapers.
Unfortunately, a majority of the Surpeme Court deemed it
necessary for a true balancing of interest to require that a private
plaintiff's recovery of monetary damages be limited to actual injury.
The Court reasoned that an injured plaintiff deserved to be compen-
sated for injury but should not be allowed to recover a windfall under
the guise of general or punitive damages. This rationale assumes that
injuries to an individual's reputation are readily apparent even though
it may be difficult to assign a monetary value to these injuries.," Ohio
courts have given a restrictive interpretation to the term "actual
damages" that was not envisioned by the Supreme Court."0 The
availability of general damages in state actions provided compensa-
tion for very real, yet hard-to-prove injury. The need to recompense
injured individuals is compelling. Public individuals may properly be
assumed to have "self-help" avenues open to them, since newspapers
will generally be eager to print those officials' reactions to a defama-
tory statement concerning them. However, private individuals who
find that the courts are closed to them may present the danger of
violence that was recognized by one of the first Ohio cases involving
a defamed individual, and "their [the defamatory statements] tend-
ency to provoke breaches of the public peace" ' may well be the
result.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court could have provided the needed "breathing
space" for the news media by allowing the media a qualified privilege
against public persons, which could only be defeated by clear and
convincing proof of actual malice. For defamations of private individ-
uals, plaintiffs could have been required to show the media to have
been at fault. By severely limiting a private individual's ability to
recover damages from the "subtle" injuries associated with the tort
of libel, the Court may well have foreclosed the action of libel to a
plaintiff injured by a member of the news media.
Victims of a defamatory attack by the media may now be more
'0 For example, a defamed real estate developer may never be aware of potential investors
who fail to invest because of a newspaper's negligent report of the developer's credit and
therefore the injured developer will not be able to prove this loss as actual damages. This was
the plaintiff's claim, which was dismissed on summary judgment, in Mead v. Horvitz Publishing
Co., No. 2083 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist., June 13, 1973) (unreported). See supra, note 98 and
accompanying text.
"I1 See Campbell v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., No. 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.,
March, 1972) (J. Rutherford concurring) (unreported).
,01 Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 532, 533 (1834).
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successful in bringing their action under a theory of invasion of a
right of privacy, by alleging specifically that the defamatory state-
ment places the plaintiff in a "false light" in the public eye." 3 In
Time, Inc. v. Hill,"4 the Court applied the Times immunity to protect
a magazine from a "newsworthy" individual suing under the "false
light" theory of an invasion of privacy. In the recent case of Cantrell
v. Forest City Publishing Co.," 5 the Supreme Court upheld a federal
district court's judgment that allowed a newspaper to be held liabile
for actual damages under the "false light" theory of an invasion of
privacy. The district court awarded actual damages to the plaintiff
since the reporter had portrayed the plaintiff "knowingly and with
reckless disregard for the truth in a false light." Under the theory of
respondeat superior the defendant newspaper was held liable for the
defamatory article written by its agent within the scope of his employ-
ment. In light of Gertz, defamed plaintiffs may abandon the action
of libel in favor of a "false light" action brought against the news
media if the Times "actual malice" standard can be met as .to the
culpability of the agent-reporter.
What the Court tried to give with one hand in Gertz-a less
stringent standard of culpability than the actual malice standard for
the use of private individuals-it took away with the other by prevent-
ing recovery for the presumed damages emanating from a defama-
tory attack on the reputation of an individual. The Court may seek
to ease the burden of future'plaintiffs in libel actions by following the
respondent superior theory to allow "actual damage" recoveries
against publishers for the "actual malice" of their agents.
William L Kohn
" For a description of this cause of action see W. PROSSER, TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971);
and Wade, Defamation and the Right to Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
419 U.S. 245 (1974).
